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Abstract
     Outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) services
which are central to business strategy may be risky.
Managers have made the outsourcing decision both to
concentrate financially on the core competencies and to
rid themselves of a troublesome and cost inefficient
department.  More recent research has, however, cast
doubt on the promises of huge savings.
     In this paper, we consider the likelihood that
outsourcing may lead to the loss of organisational
knowledge – that organisations outsourcing their total
Information Systems operations may also have lost
irreplaceable tacit, cross-functional knowledge which
subsisted within the minds of the professional systems
analysts.
     The findings of our research revealed that expert
systems analysts possess a unique organisational
understanding and draw on this knowledge to operate
efficiently in their environment. We present a model that
will allow future researchers to build on our findings and
examine whether outsourcing can lead to a loss of
organisational memory.
1. Introduction
     Outsourcing of the Information Systems (IS) operation
is a trend that has been observed in many organisations
over the last fifteen years. The outsourcing decision by
Kodak in 1989, which established this trend, was
motivated by the perception that the budget for
Information Technology (IT) was excessive for a non-core
business activity [12]. Many organisations have since
been motivated by this factor to outsource IS [9, 5].
However, as many authors [9, 17] have argued, IS is both
a core activity, deeply intertwined with organisational
operations, and an important tool for implementing
strategic business decisions.  The early promise of
outsourcing, which included trimmed and focused
organisations together with projected financial savings,
has increasingly been called into question – IS
outsourcing has become the focus of significant concern
within the academic (and, increasingly, the professional)
literature [1, 29].
     The IS department is in the interesting position of
providing services to the whole organisation, developing
and enhancing systems which operate both within and
between individual departments – systems which are
highly interconnected with the operations of and between
those departments. We see, therefore, system analysts
within the IS department as the most significant group of
staff familiar with the organisation’s operation across
functional boundaries at the tactical and operational level.
A high level of cross-functional knowledge of the
organisation’s operation and of its political system (both
at a formal and informal level) is, therefore, a major
success factor in the effective deployment of information
systems.
     Research into Information Systems outsourcing has
not, so far, seriously addressed the possibility that the loss
of organisational knowledge can significantly compromise
an organisation’s strategic response.  Organisational
growth is dependent on the utilisation of organisational
memory to select new developments and strategies
through so-called second order, or double-loop learning
[3]. There are arguments both for and against a
conservative approach to organisational knowledge.  On
the one hand, Earl [9] argues that the outsourcing of
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operations which form key parts of business strategy
development may, through consequent loss of
organisational knowledge, reduce an organisation’s ability
to implement changes.  On the other hand, Robey et al.
[25] have suggested that residual knowledge may impede
an organisation’s ability to instigate change.  They argue
that an organisation is unlikely to enter into business
ventures or markets where previous ventures by
themselves or other organisations have proved
unsuccessful.
     In our research programme, we investigate the
potential impact of a decision to outsource the IS
operation on the long-term strategic flexibility of the
organisation.  In this paper we will present the model
which guides our research and then begin to explore the
principal assumption underlying this model – that tacit
cross-functional knowledge of the host organisation
subsists within the IS operation.  It is clear that, if such
knowledge could be shown not to subsist within the IS
operation, the model which guides the research
programme would be valueless.  The question which
forms the focus of this paper, then, is:
     “Does the Information System operation within an
organisation hold tacit cross-functional knowledge of the
organisation?”
     Having established the primary objective of the paper,
that is, having demonstrated the possession of tacit cross-
functional knowledge of the organisation (we are not
concerned here with tacit professional knowledge in a
more general sense) by requirements engineering
professionals (systems analysts in commercial practice),
we proceed to consider the process by which such
knowledge is accumulated.  We argue that, in the case of
systems analysts, knowledge of the organisation is held,
not only in semantic memory, but also in episodic
memory.  “Compiled” knowledge appears to be acquired
over time and to be given depth by personal perceptions
of events. This type of knowledge can, therefore, not
readily be replaced – which suggests that outsourcing can
lead to a long-term loss of what we might call
“organisational memory”.
     Following an explanation of the concepts and the
motivation of the research, the paper will build an
understanding of organisational memory and tacit
knowledge and, thus, contextualise the impact of their
erosion within the IS functions of the organisation.  In
final sections, the findings of the investigation, based on a
series of snapshot case studies of system analysts from
various industry sectors, are presented and analysed.
2. Basic Concepts and the Conceptual Model
The literature presents two opposing views of the
impact of knowledge in strategic changes. The
management view stresses the need for knowledge to
make informed decisions [30, 2, 14] while some authors
argue that residual knowledge may obstruct the process
[27, 16].   This dichotomy suggests the conceptual model,
illustrated in Figure 1, which guides our examination of
the impact of outsourcing.
Figure 1. Overview of our guiding conceptual model.
     Erosion of cross-functional knowledge within the
organisation (which we, perhaps loosely, term
“organisational memory”) may have a serious operational
impact. The fundamental assumption underlying this
model is that internal information analysts and developers
have over time built an invaluable holistic, and largely
tacit, understanding of the organisation.  These people are
in a key position to evaluate the way in which changes can
cause a ripple effect throughout the functions of the
organisation. The loss of cross-functional tacit knowledge
can therefore, we suggest, hinder an organisation’s ability
to implement strategic changes and damage potentially
successful business ventures.
     It has also been found, however, that residual
organisational memory can itself hinder an organisation’s
ability to learn and undertake strategic changes.
Knowledge of past failures cannot simply be unlearned –
it seems particularly difficult, in action, to overlook one’s
established cognitive maps which  connect organisational
actions to outcomes [25:6,15: 18]. As the organisation
moves into new environments and niches, it may have to
discard misleading and obsolete knowledge, learn new
responses and build new mental maps. Hedgeberg, who
described the unlearning activity as an important part of
understanding, feels that slow unlearning is a crucial
weakness in many organisations.
3. Outsourcing & Organisational Knowledge
3.1. Outsourcing
The outsourcing explosion in the last decade has been
facilitated by many factors: financial, business, technical
and political [17, 6]. Organisations have made the
outsourcing decision primarily motivated by the perceived
Outsourcing
Loss of
organisational
memory
Decreased
resistance to
change
Decreased
ability to
implement
change
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benefits of financial restructuring. The injection of cash
associated with the sale of an organisation’s IT assets can
make an important contribution to a troubled or declining
business. The compiled problems of IT budget blow-outs,
a shortage of IT staff and management’s resistance to
investing in IT has made outsourcing an appealing option
[9, 5]. However, the literature suggests that outsourcing
facilities central to business development strategies is a
risky option and may reduce an organisation’s ability to
implement changes. Outsourcing such an operation can
erode important organisational knowledge. It appears that
the key to successful outsourcing is selective or “smart”
outsourcing [16, 9]. The connotation of  “smart” sourcing
is that organisations will consider the implications of
losing key staff with critical skills and organisational
cross-functional knowledge before making the
outsourcing decision.
3.2. Organisational Knowledge
Alavi [1] offers the following working definition of
knowledge based on Huber [16] and Nonaka’s [22]
definitions:
      “Knowledge is justified personal belief that increases
an entity’s potential for effective action” [1:17].
     It is important here to also include organisational
learning and organisational memory, concepts which are
interrelated as indicated in Figure 2.
Learning is derived from observation
Knowledge is built from learning
Organisational memory is stored knowledge
Modification of action to improve performance
Figure 2. The building of organisational memory
     Our investigation identifies both explicit and tacit
cross-functional knowledge noting the two are neither
mutually exclusive nor always clearly differentiable. Tacit
knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge through
some form of expression. Alavi defined tacit knowledge
as:
     “Knowledge that is unarticulated, is rooted in action
and experience, and is situated in context [1:17].
in contrast to explicit knowledge which she describes as
knowledge that is articulated in some symbolic form.
     Levitt and March [18] base their interpretation on
theories of organisational learning and behavioural studies
of organisations. Their first observation, which is
synthesised from the work of Cyert and March [4] and
Nelson [20] on organisational behaviour and economic
change respectively, is that organisational behaviour is
based on the routines of matching procedures to situations
rather than on calculating choices. Their second
observation is that organisational action is based on past
events:  decisions are motivated by interpretations of the
past rather than expectations of the future.
     A person learns by developing interpretations of
information through a new understanding of events [13].
Organisations learn in a similar way, although Fiol
pointed out that organisational learning is not embedded
in any single person but, instead, entails the ability to
share a common understanding. Robey et al. [27] explain
that learning is accomplished both through formal training
and through participating in practice and show that
learning and actions are related. It is therefore useful to
examine how individual knowledge and skills are
required. Dreyfus’ five-stage model of mental activities
involved in directed skill acquisition [8] is cited
throughout the literature on knowledge attainment. This
seminal model gives a valuable insight into the stages of
understanding and experience through which systems
analysts in organisations pass.  Many of our skills (e.g.
basic general and cultural skills) are developed at an early
age and are shaped by hereditary abilities [19]. Dreyfus’
model, by contrast, focuses on adult learning through the
stages of novice, advanced beginner, competence,
proficiency and expertise – see Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Dreyfus’ model of skill
acquisition. Adapted from  Eraut [11:126].
Level 1 Novice
Rigid adherence to taught rules or plans
Little situational perception
No discretionary judgement
Level 2 Advanced Beginner
Guidelines for action based on attributes or
aspects (aspects are global characteristics of
situations recognisable only after some prior
experience)
Situational perception still limited
All attributes and aspects are treated separately
and given equal importance
Level 3 Competent
Coping with crowdedness
Now sees actions at least particularly in terms of
longer-term goals
Conscious deliberate planning and testing rules
Standardised and routinised procedures
Level 4 Proficient
See situations holistically rather than in terms of
aspects
See what is most important in a situation
Perceives deviations from the normal pattern
Decision-making less laboured
Uses maxims for guidance, whose meaning
varies according to the situation
Level 5 Expert
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No longer relies on rules, guidelines or maxims
Intuitive grasp of situations based on deep tacit
understanding
Analytical approaches used only in novel
situations, when problems occur or when
justifying conclusions
Vision of what is possible
     Polanyi [24] identified tacit human knowledge by
reconsidering the obvious fact that “we can know more
than we can tell” [24:4].  He explained that we can
recognise a person’s face amongst a million others, but we
cannot tell how we recognise it.  He went further and
explained how universities try to teach students to identify
diseases, rocks, plants and animals by practical exercises
and ostensive definition to breach the gap between what
the teacher wants to tell and what the words mean. We do
not learn by theory alone. Important details that the
teacher could not tell, he argues, are only available
through direct observation and personal experiences.
Polanyi distinguishes between the intellectual and
practical knowledge as “knowing what” and “knowing
how” and explains that one cannot be present without the
other. The acquisition of tacit knowledge was illustrated
with an example of subjects receiving an electric shock
when they uttered certain syllables. After a while the
participant appeared to anticipate the shock at the sight of
these syllables, but could not identify them. The
participant had acquired knowledge similar in character to
how we recognise a person’s face, but can tell neither
what it is, nor how it was learnt.
     Tulving’s [28] theory of memory (discussed, for
example, in Eraut [11] distinguishes between “episodic”
memory for events that are personally experienced and
“semantic” memory for general knowledge. He offers a
useful distinction between knowledge gained through
experience and generalised knowledge, and presents a
clear path of tacit learning (A1) as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Memory structures and knowledge-
acquisition pathways.[11:126].
     The figure illustrates that the behavioural
consequences of learning follow from the interaction of
experience and knowledge with memory.  In path A,
personally experienced events stored as episodic memory
are compiled into a representation of general knowledge,
while, through path B, knowledge gained from external
sources (such as documents or reported experience or
knowledge) is added. Path A1 represents the direct
influence of event knowledge on performance.  Tulving
[28] suggests that, in general, multiple learning pathways
apply contemporaneously. In the absence of event
knowledge, performance is degraded – a view which is
consistent with Polanyi’s theory of personal perception.
     The model provides an explanation of why both theory
and practice are needed to gain understanding [10].  Eraut
believes that knowledge has to be transformed to become
useable in a contextually appropriate way: “Learning
takes place during use, and transformation of knowledge
into situationally appropriate form means that it is no
longer the same knowledge it was prior to it first being
used [10:20]. Experience is apprehended and made
meaningful at a higher level, and becomes experience that
is taken for granted.  It can therefore be argued that the
individual’s perception of the organisation is not only
shaped through lived episodes over time, but is also
transformed by the contextual meaning the individual
places on his/her experiences.
     Much of the research on organisational memory and
learning avoids issues about whether an organisation can
really do anything by itself, or whether the concept of the
learning organisation is a “merely apparent” effect of the
work of its individual members.  Senge [26], for example,
concludes:
     “Organisations learn only through individuals who
learn. Individual learning does not guarantee
organisational learning. But without it no organisational
learning occurs” [26:114].
     Hedberg [15] offers a descriptive model (Figure 4) to
explain the system in which individual action leads to
organisational action which, in turn, raises environmental
responses.  The environmental responses are related back
to the individuals in the organisation and influence their
knowledge and preferences, which will influence their
future action.
Fig 4 The cycle of organisational learning. [15].
     The model clarifies the action between individual and
organisational learning. It is the individuals that act and
PRACTICE
EXPERIENCE
PUBLIC
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learn from acting. The organisation is merely the stage. It
is therefore personal experiences that modify
organisational responses [15]. However, experiences are
captured by routines and remain within the organisation
after the members who experienced them have left. As the
individuals develop their personalities, habits and beliefs
over time the organisation preserves norms, values,
traditions, culture and mental maps as organisational
memory. This heritage knowledge is then transmitted to
new members [18, 15].
4. Method
     In the paper so far, we have described our motivation
for investigating organisational memory and tacit
organisational knowledge within the IS operation, then
briefly reviewed the theoretical literature which describes
these concepts.  In this section we describe the structure of
an empirical, qualitative study which we have undertaken
with a view to establishing a link between the bodies of
theory which reflects to knowledge in organisations and
the effect of outsourcing.
4.1. Research design and data collection
     We selected a qualitative and interpretive approach to
data collection and analysis. The interpretative research
uses rigorous methods, collecting qualitative data to
develop a rich understanding of social and cultural context
[21]. In this exploratory investigation, where we are trying
to elicit feelings and motivations, it is appropriate to
utilise qualitative interviews.
     We selected ten systems analysts from five different
industry sectors to participate in a series of snapshot case
studies and, in a series of taped interviews, posed semi-
structured, open-ended questions. The theoretical
literature described in Section 3 guided our data
collection, but we nonetheless both sought richness of
detail and allowed insights grounded in the data to modify
our interview protocol.  Protocol modifications were both
ad hoc – i.e. interview questions were modified and
reordered as a consequence of our interpretation of the
responses of the participants – and post hoc in the sense
that the base protocol was reconsidered on the basis of the
experience of each interview in turn. This allowed us
significant flexibility to follow leads and change the
direction of the interviews as the research progresses.
     While this approach provides enormous scope for the
generation of insight and the building of theory, we
recognise that it impacts negatively on the presumed
generalisability of our results.
4.2. Analysis of text
The taped interviews were transcribed and examined to
find indicators of formal and tacit cross-functional
knowledge. There were 152 sentences containing
indicators that would assist our research theory building.
The abbreviated sentences were then coded according to
context and combined with sentences of similar meaning.
Finally, the sentences were grouped around four major
issues which emerged, after the interviews, as being the
key concerns to the participants:
1. Understanding the “Big Picture” (the organisational
context)
2. Knowledge of people and the social structure of the
organisation
3. Knowledge gained from experience (individual
perception of situations)
4. Documentation (in Tulving’s terms, public
prepositional knowledge)
     As the interviews were analysed, it also became clear
that it was both possible and useful to group the
interviews into categories determined by the background
and experience of the interview subjects.
4.3. Grouping of Subjects
     Subjects were classified according to industry
experience and familiarity with their organisations.  In
undertaking this classification, we differentiate between
inexperience and unfamiliarity:
• A systems analyst will, normally, have completed
some formal education equipping the subject with a
solid foundation on which to build professional
expertise through industry experience.  We would
argue that compiled professional experience, which
might include analytical, technical, managerial and
interpersonal skills, is “portable” between
jobs/employers.  Subjects were considered
“inexperienced”, for the purposes of this study, if they
had less than two years’ professional experience as
systems analysts.
• Conversely, “familiarity” (or organisational
knowledge) is specific to each organisation and
relates to how things get done and how decisions get
made in practice.  Aspects of this familiarity might
include knowledge of internal politics and culture,
competitive structure of the organisation and the
implementation of strategy in practice within the
organisation.   Subjects in our sample fell
conveniently into two “familiarity” categories, thus it
was not necessary for us to consider seriously an
appropriate boundary between these categories.
Those subjects considered to be “unfamiliar” had
been employed by the organisation for less than
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eighteen months; those considered to be “familiar”
had been employed by their organisation for several
years.
     Consequently we structured our analysis of the
interviews around four potential categories of analysts as
illustrated in Figure 5 and explained in Table2.
Fig 5. The four subject categories
Table 2. Summary of categories of analysts
Category 1 Inexperienced and unfamiliar.
The two subjects in this category were employed
in a fast-paced and new technology-centric
industry. They had been with the organisation
less than eighteen months and were graduates
with less than two years’ postgraduate
professional experience. They assigned all
aspects equal importance but appeared to test the
boundaries of organisational procedures. This
would place them between the levels “Advanced
Beginners” and “Competence” according to
Dreyfus’ model.
Category 2 Experienced and unfamiliar.
This subject in this category worked for the same
organisation as did those in Category 1.  The
subject had about ten years’ experience in the
industry, but had been with the organisation just
one year. Industry experience places this
category at Dreyfus’ level of “Expertise” but due
to the lack of organisational familiarity only at
the level of “Competence”.
Category 3 Experienced and familiar.
The seven subjects in this category came from
various industries within the newspaper, banking
and automotive sectors. All interviewees had at
least 10 years’ professional experience and had
worked for their current employer, often in a
variety of positions, for more than ten years. This
category was clearly at the level of “Expertise” in
Dreyfus’ model.
Category 4 Inexperienced and familiar.
Subjects in this category (once a well-populated
category prior to extensive university education
in IT) are employees who transferred from other
parts of the organisation to work (and be trained
on the job) in IT.  No subjects in this category
were identified in time for our  study, the idea of
internal training in IT appears to have moved out
of favour, although following our study we
become aware of a Melbourne organisation
which had re-established the practice.
Unfortunately, their programme has not been in
place long enough for qualified interview
subjects to become available.
     The research subjects were then analysed separately
for each category, and the findings divided into
appropriate issues of:
• Organisational Awareness (Examining levels of
cross-functional knowledge of the organisations)
• Performance Support and Tools (How tacit
knowledge was used to enhance performance)
• Culture and Objective Alignment (Assess the level of
understanding of explicit as opposed to implicit goals
and organisational culture)
     The findings were compared across the categories to
accentuate any differences between, for example, the
“Unfamiliar and Experienced” and “Familiar and
Experienced” analysts and are presented in the result
section of this paper.
5. Results
5.1. Organisational Awareness
     The overall organisational awareness exhibited by both
interviewees in Category 1 was shallow and narrow,
focusing on their immediate section and problems. Neither
expressed much interest in the global and industrial
context of the organisation or the products it produces,
and related most of their responses to the systems area.
The subjects referred to this large organisation as a “huge
bureaucratic monster” with structured rules and
procedures for system implementations and changes that
seemed a hindrance rather than assistance to them. The
graduates were assigned mentors, who assisted them to
develop important relationships with experienced systems
analysts. They felt that the knowledge of valued analysts
was important not only to bridge the gap of knowledge
they had, but also saw a benefit in developing influential
relationships.
     Conversely the subject in Category 2 felt that
organisational awareness was of paramount importance,
and had made it top priority to familiarise himself not only
with the organisational structure, but also with the jobs of
his colleagues and how their work might impact on one
another. He also stressed the importance of following the
Inexperienced Experienced
Familiar
Unfamiliar
Categorisation according to experience
and organisational familiarity
Category
4
Category
3
Category
1
Category
2
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organisational objectives and keeping up with new
developments in the industry, to be aware of the “big
picture”. However, he placed little significance in the
systems per se, and was confident his industry experience
would enable him to operate any system efficiently as he
remarked, “The system is a system, you don’t need
anything special to understand a system”. The subject
also felt, in contrast to the subjects in Category 1, that the
rules and procedures were helpful tools to synchronise
system changes and projects and hinted that “rogue”
teams were hindering rather than fast tracking
developments.
     The subjects in Category 3 conveyed a deep
involvement and pride in their organisations and jobs.
They felt that unless they had complete knowledge of not
only the organisation, its divisions and overall global
situation, but also every detail of the products they
produced, they would not be able to operate efficiently. In
contrast to Categories 1 and 2, they perceived the
organisation, the system and the people as an integrated
whole and felt an integral part of its structure, culture,
processes and systems. They were aware of the distinct
skill sets of colleagues and would call on those people to
gain specific information. However they related that
people were usually contacting them for help. The
subjects in this Category appeared to be unaware of the
organisational rules and procedures that seemed so
controversial in the other Categories.
     The criticism of the organisational rules and
procedures by the subjects in Category 1 is consistent with
behaviour of the competent learner described in the
Dreyfus model of skill acquisition [7]. Dreyfus discovered
that without the “rule-testing stage” and the acceptance
of risk and responsibility, the competent learner would
become bored and regress rather than advance to the next
level of performance [7]. However, the subject in
Category 2 sees the value of rules and procedures from an
overall perspective because of his understanding of the
organisational objectives. This would indicate that he is at
the higher level than Category 1 on the Dreyfus model as
a proficient learner. The subjects in Category 3 operate
from a deep holistic understanding that resides with the
“expert performer” in Dreyfus’ model of skill acquisition.
It is at this skill level, where enough situational experience
has been attained, that we are able to detect indicators of
tacit knowledge and appreciate how the foundations of
this knowledge is gained.  The subjects were continually
updating their overall understanding to retain their level of
knowledge.
5.2. Performance Support and Tools
     All the categories recognised the importance of
developing relationships and networks of people they
could call on not only to extend their organisational
understanding, but also to increase skill levels and
efficiency. It was obvious to them that the systems
changes and developments needed to be done in
collaboration and they agreed that initiatives that were
similar and able to impact each other were developed
more efficiently together. However, the subjects in
Category 1 could also see a benefit from having people
“on your side” to enable them to move outside the formal
procedures and give them the “clout” to get things done,
which new graduates would normally not have. The
subjects in this category were eager to perform well and
be noticed for advancement as well as personal
satisfaction, and were therefore mindful of developing
relationships not only with experienced analysts, but also
with the more influential staff. The subject in Category 2
had developed relationships by exchanging knowledge
with colleagues within the organisation as well as
externally. Contrary to Category 1, he felt the
relationships increased efficiency and allowed people to
bounce ideas off each other. He explained “You assume
that, whenever you’ve got a problem, someone else has
had the same problem before you”. He was actively
developing solutions based on other people’s efforts. The
subjects in Category 2 and 3 had the ability to anticipate
problems and stressed that there was no easy way to find
errors, just a lot of “footwork”. These categories had
implemented resourceful and clever solutions not only
based on ideas from other people, but the subjects in
Category 3 had also utilised their historical knowledge.
Several of the analysts in this category had a scientific
background and intuitively drew on these analytical skills
to apply logical reasoning. One subject referred to his
problem-solving skills as “skills you don’t realise you
have..They become second nature like reading. Your eyes
are drawn to the mistakes”. The subjects explained that
they had gained their experience by working through
situations as they had presented themselves over their
years with the organisation. They were aware that their
perceptions of the problems and solutions were essentially
personal and only acquired over time. One subject
explained that you always lose something when you train
a new person, and that a high staff turnover could
therefore reduce understanding: “You get somebody who
has 100% of the knowledge. They train a new person and
only 90% gets transferred to them, then only 90% of 90%
and so on. After a couple of years it comes down to the
person who doesn’t know what they are doing.”
     The subjects in all categories agreed that knowledge is
best gained from personal experience and observation. As
one subject stated clearly “There are no books to teach
you this stuff, it’s just experience”.
     All the categories supported the concept of
documentation and agreed that verification of systems
changes was mandatory but, interestingly, they disagreed
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on what could be codified. Category 1 could not think of
anything that they were unable to document, and
depended on their notes not only to relieve information
overload, but also for future revision and study. They
distrusted verbal communication and felt that
documentation would, should the need arise, enable them
to relate circumstances and events and hopefully escape
criticism. They expressed a need for a document of the
whole organisation, the sections, the people and most
importantly of all the systems and projects including
various impacts. The subject in Category 2 had initially
suggested that this type of documentation would be useful
in the induction of new staff. However, after a year in the
organisation he now feels it would not be possible to
maintain such documentation given a fast moving
environment. He consequently believes the value of such a
set of documents would be doubtful. Ironically, the
subjects in Category 1 argued later in the interviews that
reading documents was not only time consuming, but that
they were also difficult to comprehend. Category 3 felt
that the concept of a knowledge database was an excellent
method to distribute and share information, however, the
subjects in this category pointed out that it requires a high
degree of management’s commitment of resources, which
inevitably has led to the incompleteness and validity of the
information stored. They explained that not only would it
be time consuming to codify everything satisfactorily, but
they also felt it was impossible to document their
perception of the organisation, circumstances and their
knowledge of people.
     Polanyi inquired “how can one see a problem?.. For
to see a problem is to see something that is hidden.”
[24:21] He cited Plato to emphasise this contradiction
“..to search for the solution to a problem is an absurdity;
for either you know what you are looking for, and then
there is no problem; or you do not know what you are
looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything.”
This suggests strongly that “..if all knowledge is explicit,
i.e., capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot know
a problem or look for its solution..and if problems
nevertheless exist, and discoveries can be made by
solving them, we can know things, that we cannot tell”
[24:22]. The subjects in Category 3 displayed the abilities
to anticipate problems and implement solutions at a level
that is characteristic of expertise. Their intuitive responses
and ability to zero in on the accurate region of a problem
were strong indicators of a deep holistic understanding of
the situations, and supports Dreyfus’ [7:31] observation of
expert tacit knowledge. The consensus of all the subjects
that knowledge is best gained from personal experience
and observation is consistent with Polanyi’s [24] findings
that practical experience tends to bridge the gap between
what the teacher wants to tell and what the words mean.
He explains that we do not learn by theory alone, but that
important details the teacher could not tell are left behind.
These can only be perceived by practical experience. One
subject illustrated this point in his remark ”I had to live
with them, work with them, talk to them – for just about a
year before I had really understood.”
5.3. Culture and Objective Alignment
     Goal alignment is a slippery concept. Schneider
[27:157] points out that not only is “organisational
culture” subjectively determined and, in any event, local
in scope but:
• explicit (expressed) culture and politics often differ
from the implicit (intrinsic); and
• The implicit culture - and the hidden assumptions that
underpin it - is generally a source of great subjective
variety.
     One subject in Category 1 related that he had bent the
rules and cultivated relationships to enable him to work on
initiatives that had not been scheduled. The procedures
required to gain approval for such jobs seemed too slow
and restrictive and usually a request for unscheduled jobs
came from the managers. This rule-testing stage is an
important phase in skill development and therefore the
flexibility of action being described by this subject is not,
of course, unexpected. It is however, a two-edged sword:
• On one hand, the subject is able to be reactive to
changing needs and, thus, flexible;
• On the other, the subject does not have a sufficiently
broad knowledge of organisational strategy to fully
evaluate the implications of a reactive refocusing of
its priorities.
     The subject from Category 2, however, displayed an
interest in the organisation and was focused on benefits
which had the potential to advance the organisation
overall efficiency, conservation of resources and generally
working smarter. He argued that inexperienced graduates
were very good at developing clever solutions, but lacked
the overview to evaluate whether the issue needed a long-
or short-term solution or if, indeed, it should be developed
at all. The subjects in Category 3 were very
organisationally focused and immersed in their jobs and
their industries. Not only did they seem to be enjoying
their jobs, but also appeared to be very good at them.
They did not follow any rules, nor was there any
noticeable constraint placed on the subject in this
category. It would seem they were very trusted employees
of the organisations. This category was clearly at Dreyfus’
level of “Expertise”. An expert intuitively sees what to do
without applying rules. He/s does not solve problems.
S/he does what normally works and, of course, that
normally works. The expert achieves objectives
apparently without having past objectives in the conscious
mind.
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6. Limitations of Observations
     In the case of the organisational unit in which
interviewees in Category 1 and 2 work, we can observe:
• High staff turnover
• Relative organisational stability
• An unclear relationship between the unit and the
organisation more generally.
     It is possible that the subjects’ views were
idiosyncratic or unduly influenced by the specific
environment in which they work. Nonetheless, the views
expressed by the subjects are not in conflict with the
expectations of the research in the light of interviews with
subjects in Category 3.The subjects interviewed in this
category were from a wide range of industries. Having a
broad sample of data can strengthen the investigation by
representing a wide range of possible opinions. However,
care must be taken to represent not only the entire scope
of the industry sectors, but also in the depth of the
samples. If we are to generalise from a sample it is
important that it is large enough to represent the entire
population. It only takes a few conflicting opinions to
distort the results from an investigation with only a small
number of participants. Our investigation had two subjects
from the automotive industry and only one from each of
the other sectors. This is obviously not enough to mask
any inconsistency.
     The boundaries of what we consider to represent
“experienced” and “familiar” systems analysts (2 Years
and 18 Months respectively) were determined post hoc,
after we examined the sample. Although, as discussed
above, our “familiarity” categorisation was not
problematic, a weakness which suggests a need for further
research is acknowledged.
7. Conclusion
     This research was motivated by the trend, over the last
fifteen years, towards outsourcing the IS functions in
organisations. It was felt that the loss of key systems
analysts could seriously diminish the tacit organisational
cross-functional knowledge which is needed to implement
changes and new design features. It was anticipated that
this loss could affect the strategic responses of an
organisation. The basic concept was illustrated in the
model (Figure 1) which guides our overall research
programme, and further research was argued to be
predicated on confirmation that IS operations within
organisations hold tacit or informal cross-functional
knowledge of the organisation.
     This project forms the first part of a systematic
investigation and evaluation of the impact of IS
outsourcing on strategic flexibility within organisations.
Further research will provide a guidance for managers to
understand what part of IS must be done within the
organisation to preserve the internal knowledge and what
may, perhaps, be done better by outsourcing.
     The information gathered in this research has given a
clear indication that experienced long-term employed
systems analysts do, indeed, hold tacit cross-functional
knowledge which they utilise, not only to implement
changes, but also to find problems. Tacit knowledge of the
functions of the organisations was shown to be held by
systems analysts and the research further revealed that the
analysts generally believed the most important tacit
knowledge was their knowledge of people.  It appeared
the people were the intrinsic part of the sections, the
culture, the processes and the overall organisation. Much
knowledge possessed by the more experienced analysts
had been accumulated over time through situational
experiences and interactions with colleagues.
Significantly, the more experienced the analyst, the more
likely s/he was to believe that it was impossible to codify
considerable portions of their knowledge – and, thus,
share our conclusion that organisational memory, once
lost, cannot readily be replaced. Having confirmed our
assumptions we may proceed, with confidence in our
foundational work, to undertake detailed analysis of the
implications. We look forward to presenting this analysis
at a future conference.
     The results presented here are, perhaps, not surprising.
However the very existence of tacit cross-functional
knowledge of the organisation amongst systems analysts
which might be lost is a fundamental assumption of the
model – and an assumption about which the formal
literature has so far been silent.
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